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Comment Mario B. Lamberte
The authors have developed a model to explain why underpricing of risk is
not detected by bank shareholders and that its persistence results in com-
pression in the spread between lending and deposit rates, lending booms,
inﬂated asset prices, excess building, and real estate crashes. The model
may be described in ﬁgure 3C.1. There are ﬁve major players in the real es-
tate market, namely, the bank regulator; bank shareholders; bank man-
agement; real estate developers, consisting of both risky and safe borrow-
ers; and households who have demand for real estate, which can assume
three states with associated probabilities. In this model, a principal-agent
problem exists. Managers’ objective function is to maximize compensa-
tion. It is assumed that managers can hide bank losses. Thus, they engage
in underpricing risk, that is, lend to risky borrowers at safe rates. As the au-
thors have pointed out, “[S]uch underpricing behavior forces a race to the
bottom across lending institutions, with marketwide consequences.” Un-
der this situation, real estate markets decline more during market down-
turn in economies where risk is underpriced but reported bank losses are
expected to be lower than real estate losses. To mitigate the principal-agent
problem, the authors have oﬀered a solution: introduce mortgage securiti-
zation that will discourage lenders from underpricing risk.
Given the title of the chapter, it is worthwhile to describe the banking sys-
tem and real estate markets in Asia to see if the model and its policy impli-
cations are applicable to the region. As many analysts have observed, ﬁgure
3C.2more accurately describes the banking system in Asia than ﬁgure 3C.1.
In ﬁgure 3C.2, bank ownership is highly concentrated, and bank owners are
greatly involved in the management of their banks. Thus, the principal-
agent problem that exists under ﬁgure 3C.1 does not either exist or is less
pronounced in Asia. Even though a number of banks are publicly listed, the
listed shares as a percent of their total outstanding shares are signiﬁcantly
small compared to what can be found in more-developed economies. More-
over, many banks in Asia are either majority or minority shareholders 
of real estate companies and mortgage redemption insurance companies.
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Fig. 3C.2 Lender and developer behavior: Asian contextInterlocking directorates among these institutions also abound, facilitating
access of real estate companies to bank loans. Thus, the problem that arises
in the Asian banking system is quite diﬀerent from that described by the
model. Imprudent lending to subsidiaries, aﬃliates, and bank directors and
oﬃcers appears to be a serious problem. The solution, therefore, which
many countries in the region have attempted to do in the aftermath of the
ﬁnancial crisis, is to strengthen banking regulations including capacities of
regulators and corporate governance of banks. A strong banking sector
closely monitored by regulators can fare better in times of real estate mar-
ket downturn.
There are some nuances in developing mortgage securitization in Asia. In
the model, P denotes the price of land for development. However, valuation
of real estate properties is still a big problem in Asia. It is not unusual to ﬁnd
two signiﬁcantly diﬀerent valuations of the same property given by two real
estate appraisers. Also, benchmark yield curve is not yet ﬁrmly established
in Asia, making it diﬃcult to develop the securities market rapidly.
Turning to the empirical analysis made by the authors, the sample ap-
pears to be too small to generate enough conﬁdence in the results. More
studies of this nature using a larger sample are, therefore, called for.
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